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ESSAYS
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO COMMUNITY
BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
ChristineA. Fazio andJudith Wallace*
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
AND WHY

Do COMMUNITIES ENTER INTO THEM?

Community benefits agreements (CBAs) between developers and
community representatives have become widespread nationwide, and
such agreements have increasingly come to be viewed as part of the
regular cost of major projects such as housing, commercial
development, sports stadiums, transportation projects, power plants,
and landfills.' Typically, CBAs are agreements between a project
developer and nonprofit community groups and/or local
governments, and provide for financial grants, local hiring, affordable
housing, and/or other amenities to the community hosting the project,
.
2
in exchange for a tacit or explicit commitment to support the project.
* Christine Fazio and Judith Wallace are attorneys in the Environmental
Practice Group of Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP. Ms. Fazio is a graduate of
Fordham Law School and Ms. Wallace is a graduate of Georgetown University
Law Center. Ms. Fazio is also an adjunct professor at Fordham Law School and
teaches Land Use Law.
1. See generally Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social
Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of
Current and Development Agreements, 17 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L.
113, 115, 119, 124-25, 130 *2008) (surveying recent CBAs nationwide).
2. See Julian Gross et al., Community Benefits Agreements: Making
Development Projects Accountable, Good Jobs First and the California Partnership
for Working Families, 1, 10-11 (May 2005), http://www.goodiobsfirst.ore/pdf/
cba2005 final.pdf Community Benefits Agreements: The Power, Practice,and
Promise of a ResponsibleRedevelopment Tool, Annie E. Casey Found., 1, 10-11
(2007), http://www.aecf.org/upload/PublicationFiles/AECFCBA.pdf [hereinafter
Annie E. Casey Found 1.
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Entering into CBAs can provide certainty to a developer that its
project can be constructed on time, and to a host community that the
new development will be consistent with the neighborhood's needs.
In particular, CBAs allow communities to negotiate with developers
and to offer input with respect to specific concerns without forcing
communities to legally challenge a project-which can involve
substantial legal fees with no community benefit especially if the
challenge addresses a procedural aspect of the reviews and approvals
for the project. 3 The quidpro quo is that the developer can advance a
project without the risk of delay from litigation (which could severely
impact the project's financing) and can receive positive publicity as a
good neighbor. Public support for a project can also help the
developer in securing public subsidies and obtaining prompt and
favorable action on discretionary government approvals. 4
Additionally, the community receives amenities that it would not
otherwise obtain because of local budgetary constraints. 5 As one
commentator succinctly noted, "the nationwide interest in CBAs
demonstrates a substantial level of public dissatisfaction with existing
processes." 6 Nonetheless, as discussed below, not everyone supports
CBAs, which can be viewed as improper payments, particularly
where CBAs are not authorized or required by any statute or
regulation.
Part II of this essay provides an overview of various types of CBAs
and includes examples from throughout the United States. Part III
addresses policy issues that should be considered to ensure that a
CBA is credible and enforceable, and potential legal issues raised by
CBAs.
II. WHERE AND FOR WHICH PROJECTS HAVE CBAs BEEN DEVELOPED
AND IMPLEMENTED?

Today, developers routinely provide CBAs to a community where
a new industrial use or new large development is proposed to be
sited. For the community, CBAs ensure socially responsible
development in its neighborhoods. CBAs can act as "safeguards to
3. See infra text accompanying note 6.
4. Gross, supra note 2, at 10.
5. See id. at 4.
6. Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and
Legal Enforceability, 17 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 35, 37 (2008).
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ensure that affected residents share in the benefits of major
developments" and "allow community groups to have a voice in
shaping a project, to press for community benefits that are tailored to
their particular needs, and to enforce developer's promises."7 As a
result, since 2001, the use of CBAs has become customary
throughout the country in connection with major development
projects, and CBAs have come to be viewed as part of the regular
cost of doing business.
CBAs could be a tool to address the mitigation of significant
adverse environmental impacts from a proposed project, and thus
could be included as part of an environmental impact statement or
permit (i.e., regulator could impose a condition that the developer
create a public park to address open space concerns from a new large
development). In most cases, however, CBAs address nonenvironmental issues, such as living wage requirements for workers
employed on the project, a "first source" hiring system to target job
opportunities from the project to area residents, space for a
neighborhood childcare center, construction of parks and recreational
facilities, money to local schools, or the construction of affordable
housing.9
CBAs routinely garner support from a local host community for the
siting of new industrial uses that serve a wider public good.' 0 For
instance, new landfills, waste water treatment plants, transit centers,
and power plants are public necessities that serve an entire region but
must be sited in a host community. No one wants to live next to a
landfill, waste water treatment plant, power plant, or airport, but
communities depend on the services provided by such infrastructure.
Thus, a portion of our costs in purchasing electricity, disposing of our
waste, or traveling through large transit centers is a payment to the
host community. The host community will then appropriate such
funds for local improvements, such as funding for a new or expanded
local school, park, community center, or job training center. Once

7. Gross, supra note 2, at 3.
8. See Terry Pristin, In Major Projects,Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. Times,
June 14, 2006, at C6.
9. See Gross, supra note 2, at 10.
10. See discussion infra Part II; See generally Salkin & Levine, supra note 1;
Gross, supra note 2.
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such infrastructure is built, it will remain in the host community for
twenty or more years." The following are some specific examples.
A. Energy Projects

In 2001, Calpine Corporation/Bechtel Enterprises Holdings, Inc.
and the City of San Jose agreed to a package in which Metcalf
Energy Center would provide, among other things, contracts to local
businesses, $5 million for parks and open space acquisition in the
Santa Teresa/South San Jose area, $1 million in matching funds to the
City's fund for energy conservation, and $500,000 to the City of San
Jose's "Healthy Neighborhoods Venture Fund" in exchange for the
City's support and providing of municipal services for the
construction of the 600 MW power plant.12
In 2007, as part of the re-licensing of its Niagara Power Project in
Niagara County, New York with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), the New York Power Authority (NYPA)
entered into multiple agreements with the local community in order
to obtain local community support for the continuation of the plant's
operation for another 50 years.' 3 Specifically, NYPA entered into a
CBA with Niagara County, the City of Niagara Falls, the Towns of
Lewiston and Niagara, and the school districts for the City of Niagara
Falls, Lewiston-Porter, Niagara-Wheatfield, and the Tuscarora
Nation.14 Among other projects, NYPA agreed to establish a host
community fund for capital projects and infrastructure for economic
development and public health and safety, with an initial payment of
$8 million followed by $5 million annually over the 50-year period of
the renewed FERC license, and provide a $9.5 million capital fund,
and a $1 million landscape development fund to Niagara
University.15

11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. Press Release, City of San Jose, Mayor Gonzales and Calpine Bechtel
Reach Agreement (June 13, 2001) http://www.sjmayor.org/press-room/530
calpine.html.
13. See FERC, FERC Project No. 2216-066, Final Environmental Impact
Statement for Hydropower Relicensing, Niagara Project, 1 (2006),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2006/12-29-06.asp
[hereinafter FERC]; New York State, Niagara Power Project: Relicensing,
http://niagara.nypa.gov/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
14. FERC, supra note 13, at 145-47.
15. Id. at 145, 147.
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B. TransportationProjects

In December 2004, a broad coalition of community-based
organizations and labor unions entered into a CBA with the City of
Los Angeles in connection with the Los Angeles World Airports
(LAWA) $11 billion modernization plan. 16 The City of Los Angeles
funded a CBA package valued at half a billion dollars that included:
(1) $15 million in job training funds for airport and aviation-related
jobs; (2) a local hiring program to give priority for jobs at LAX to
local residents and low-income special needs individuals; (3) funds
for soundproofing affected schools and residences; (4) funds for
studying the health impacts of airport operations on surrounding
communities; and (5) increased opportunities for local, minority, and
women-owned businesses in the modernization of LAX. 17
C. Urban Redevelopment

CBAs are also routinely provided by developers to local
community groups in connection with large new developments of
mixed commercial and residential uses that cover numerous acres and
which might involve eminent domain proceedings to acquire specific
parcels and/or changes to the local zoning map. 18 These new large
developments have the potential to displace poorer residents, cause
overcrowding in local schools and create traffic congestion. 19 Some
of these impacts can be mitigated through the environmental review
and permitting processes if agencies impose conditions on the
developer (such as adding a new road or limiting the number of
spaces in the parking garage). 20
Nevertheless, even if the
16. Amy Levine, LAXAirport CBA, Cmty. Benefits Agreements Blog, (Jan. 28,
2008, 9:36 PM), http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/01/lax-airportexpansion-cba-demonstrates.html
17. Press Release, LAX Coalition for Economic, Environmental, & Educational
Justice, Highlights of the LAX Community Benefits Agreement (Dec. 24, 2004),
http://www.edf.org/documents/4174_LAX CBA Summary.pdf
18. See discussion infra note 22 and accompanying text; See generally
Community Benefits Agreement on the Atlantic Yards Development 1-2 (June 27,
2005), available at http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/pr/cba.pdf.
19. See Salkin & Levine, supra note 1, at 132 n.20.
20. See N.Y. City Bar Ass'n, The Role of Community Benefit Agreements in
N.Y. City's Land Use Process 46 (March 8, 2010), availableat http://www.
nyplanning.org/TheRoleofCommunityBenefitAgreementsinNYCLandUseProcess.p
df.
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environmental review and permitting results in adequate mitigation,
many residents may still oppose changes, may be skeptical of
projections of economic benefits, or may not want to see the
character of the community altered by stadiums or high rise
buildings. For this reason, developers need to meet with the local
community and understand community needs in order to garner the
respect and ultimate support for what may be a significant change to
the character of a community.
One recent example of a CBA in New York that includes some of
the typical terms of CBAs for urban redevelopment projects is the
Atlantic Yards CBA. This CBA is also a more traditional CBA in
that it was negotiated among a private developer and local
community groups. The Atlantic Yards CBA involves the
development of a new basketball arena as well as new commercial
and residential uses. 2 1 The Atlantic Yards CBA between Forest City
Ratner, the developer, and eight community groups includes: (1)
assurance of middle-income and affordable housing; (2)
environmental assurances; (3) educational initiatives; (4) jobs for
minorities and women; (5) pre- and post-construction job training; (6)
a commitment to develop community facilities such as childcare,
youth and senior centers; and (7) community access to utilize the
arena for local events such as religious congregations and high school
and college graduations at "reasonable rents." 22 The Atlantic Yards
CBA also illustrates the limits of such agreements, because it has not
prevented litigation by local opponents challenging various aspects of
the project. 2 3
Other local CBAs may be more targeted to the economic impacts
of a project. An example of such a CBA, the Bronx Terminal Market
development project, consists of the construction of a million square
foot retail space in the Bronx.24 Approval for the project includes an
approximately $5 million CBA which provides, in part, that: (1) no
Wal-Mart or Wal-Mart subsidiary would be permitted to have space
in the shopping center; (2) the developer would pay $3 million to a
21. Community Benefits Agreement on the Atlantic Yards Development 1-2
(June 27, 2005), available at http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/pr/cba.pdf.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2008).
24. David Lombino, Shopping Center in Bronx Approved; Benefit Agreement
Bans Wal-Mart, New York Sun, Feb. 2, 2006, at 4, availableat http://www.
nysun.com/article/26932.
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job-referral program that aims to help employ local Bronx residents;
(3) the developer would set aside 18,000 square feet of retail space
for local small businesses; and (4) the developer would pay half the
membership dues for 2,000 local families if a store that charges a
membership fee opens in the shopping center. 25

III. POLICY ISSUES

RELATED TO COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENTS

A number of factors should be considered to ensure that a CBA
actually resolves controversy over a project, and is not a wholly
illusory settlement that serves as a fig leaf merely used to obtain
government approvals of an unpopular project.
A. Are CBAs Unfair To Developers?

Overall, CBAs can represent a "win-win" situation for a developer
and the local community. Nevertheless, there are many individuals
who are critical of CBAs and are concerned that CBAs could evolve
from a voluntary tool of developers to a mandatory requirement
imposed on all projects.2 6
Generally, agencies and zoning boards must adhere to the statutory
criteria set forth in zoning ordinances or other regulations when
evaluating requests for permits and approvals for a project. These
agencies and boards are not permitted to impose additional
requirements that are unrelated to the impacts of the project or the
criteria established by law in granting approvals if not voluntarily
agreed upon by the developer. 2 7 However, abuse can occur if
government officials impose a CBA as part of their approval of a
project. A good example of such abuse occurred recently when the
New York City Council voted to disapprove a land use action for a
proposed development by Related Companies (Related) of the
Kingsbridge Armory in the Bronx because Related would not agree
25. Id.; CBA: Carrion'sBenefit Agreement, The Neighborhood Retail Alliance
Blog (Feb. 6, 2006, 10:31 EST), http://momandpopnyc.blogspot.com/2006/02/cbacarrions-benefit-agreement.html; See generally Salkin, supra note 1, at 115-130
(providing examples of numerous CBAs around the country).
26. See, e.g., Pristin, supra note 8, at C6 (addressing concerns with CBAs).
27. See, e.g., N.Y. Town Law § 274-b(4) (McKinney 2004) ("The authorized
board shall have the authority to impose such reasonable conditions and restrictions
as are directly related to and incidental to the proposed special use permit.")
(emphasis added).
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to negotiate a CBA that would require retail tenants to pay a living
wage to all employees.28 This example of abuse fosters the views
held by those who do not support CBAs. 29 To address this issue, the
Land Use Committee of the New York City Bar Association
recommended that New York City "announce that it will not consider
CBAs in making its determinations in the land use process, will give
no 'credit' to developers for benefits they have provided through
CBAs, and will play no role in encouraging, monitoring or enforcing
such agreements."30 It is important to note that the New York City
Bar Association report found that agreements between developers
and community groups that are reached independent of land use
processes are still acceptable. 3 1 In fact, it is questionable whether
government actions to impose a CBA unrelated to environmental or
land use impacts could withstand a legal challenge because agencies
and zoning boards are required to adhere to statutory criteria set forth
in zoning ordinances and other regulations when evaluating land use
and zoning applications. 32 The New York City Bar Association also
believes such agency action to impose CBAs on a developer could
run afoul of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, which
require that exactions have a substantial nexus to impacts of the

development. 33
Critics of CBAs also suggest that there could be the perception that
the approval process is artificially slowed down when a developer
does not propose a CBA.3 4 Given this criticism, it is questionable
whether this is really a concern of developers or a disingenuous
objection by opponents of CBAs. Generally, developers are interested
in being viewed as good neighbors and are interested in working with
a community, especially if it will reduce the risk of litigation that
could halt or delay their project. 35
28. See Sam Dolnick, Voting 451, Council Rejects $310 Million Planfor Mall
at Bronx Armory, N.Y. Times, Dec.15, 2009, at A38.
29. See, e.g., supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n, The Role of Community Benefit Agreements in N.Y.
City 's Land Use Process46 (2010), available at http://www.nyplanning.org/
TheRoleofCommunityBenefitAgreementsinNYCLandUseProcess.pdf.
3 1. Cf id.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.
33. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n, supra note 30, at 36.
34. See discussion supra Part I.
35. Id.
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These concerns can be addressed by the judicious use of CBAs.
Community activists and supporters of CBAs need to be cognizant of
the proper role of CBAs. In other words, CBAs have a proper role
when dealing with new industrial uses that serve a regional public
good and with "large" new developments. This does not mean that
every local zoning approval for a new development, new apartment
complex or new business should involve a CBA. One commentator
has suggested that the impetus can come from a need for significant
tax subsidies, zoning approvals, or infrastructure development.3 6 The
critics' concern that CBAs will become an expectation of every new
project need not be an issue as long as the public and local officials
continue to view CBAs as the cost of doing business for large
industrial uses that are public necessities and large new
developments; the types of projects that have involved CBAs as
discussed above.
B. Are CBAs FairTo The Community?
Initially, one could question whether it is fair that communities
need to bargain with private actors for community resources that
governments arguably have an obligation to provide, such as
affordable housing, parks, and adequate funding for schools.
Another concern is deciding who should be the appropriate
community group that is involved in negotiating the CBA. Ideally, a
broad and representative group of parties with longstanding roots in
the community that are affected by the new use should be involved in
negotiations. These parties may include community organizations,
religious leaders, labor groups, environmental groups, and small
business owners. 37 Many communities have various non-profit
organizations and community boards to address local issues."8 The
groups should not be selected by the developer or project

proponents. 39
Another question is whether the groups that negotiated the CBA
should benefit or should determine which groups should benefit.
Another challenge is how to ensure that the groups that benefit fairly
36. See David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for
Investment in America's Neighborhoods, 39 Urb. Law. 657, 659 (2007).
37. See, e.g., Annie E. Casey Found., supra note 2, at 14.
38. See, e.g., id
39. Gross, supra note 6, at 41.
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represent the community. 40 Opportunistic new groups may be
created when a new project is rumored in anticipation of participating
in a payout of benefits. Such groups are especially problematic
because their participation does not necessarily represent the
community or ensure buy-in by the community for the project. One
potential remedy is transparency in the negotiation process, by
incorporating measures such as a prohibition against funding being
directed to groups that participated in the negotiations. 41
Community funds should also go to the public and not a particular
nonprofit. If funds are used to build parks, expand public schools,
build community centers and new libraries, as well as new
apprenticeship programs, and involve a public agency as the conduit
for the funds, CBAs can ensure that not just the individual non-profits
benefit, but also the local community as a whole.
Concerns have also been raised about CBAs that involve
government actors rather than community groups. One of the many
objections to the much criticized Yankee Stadium CBA, for example,
is that it did not involve any community groups, but was negotiated
solely by elected officials.4 2 Individual elected officials might not
have the capacity to represent New York City, or even the New York
City Council, so it is not clear how New York City's Corporation
Counsel could enforce the agreement; nor is it clear who would have
the wherewithal to enforce the agreement if the council members that
signed it are not re-elected. Perhaps unsurprisingly, implementation
of this CBA has been plagued by years of delays.4 3
C. Are CBAs Unfair To Taxpayers?
When government agencies are involved in projects, either as the
developer, the major customer, or a near-partner of the developer,
there can be a concern that public funds, either in the form of taxes or
rates, are being directed to one locality through a community benefits
package. A similar situation arises when the support garnered
through a community benefits package is the rationale for
considerable taxpayer subsidies, tax breaks to developers, or the use
40. Annie E. Casey Found., supra note 2, at 18.
41. See Marcello, supra note 36, at 665-66.
42. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 1, at 123.
43. Timothy Williams, Bronx Still Seeks Benefits From Deal With Yankees,
N.Y. Times, at BI, B7 (Jan. 7, 2008).
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of eminent domain powers to assemble the property necessary for a
project.
D. EnsuringA FairNegotiatingProcess
Another concern is whether the community parties have sufficient
expertise to negotiate with developers for the CBA. If they do not, the
community groups can be provided with training (perhaps by
attorneys working pro bono) to develop the skills to advocate for
themselves in this process.44 The community parties should also be
assisted by counsel. Involving parties with the expertise to bargain
effectively will help to ensure that the process is transparent and fair,
which is critical if the resulting CBA is to actually result in an
agreement with widespread public support that provides a resolution
of potential conflicts between the community and project developers.
E. Enforceability
Another chief concern for community parties is the enforceability
of any CBA, which is key to ensuring that the promised benefits
actually materialize. The first issue is against whom the CBA is
enforceable. If there are community hiring and procurement
requirements for the project, the CBA should be crafted to ensure that
those requirements are enforceable against the developer's
subcontractors and tenants who may be doing most of the
procurement and hiring. 45
Another question is who has standing to enforce the CBA.
Organizations that are parties or are identified as third-party
beneficiaries in the CBA typically have the right to enforce the
agreement, 46 and therefore it is important to ensure that at least one
party with the resources and likely inclination to enforce the CBA has
the right to do so. Finally, while the CBA should contemplate
potential project changes due to budget constraints or changing
economic condition, the CBA should also include specific deadlines
44. Annie E. Casey Found., supra note 2, at 22.
45. See Gross, supra note 2, at 69, 71-72.
46. See generally Orna S. Paglin, Criteria for Recognition of Third Party
Beneficiaries' Rights, 24 New Eng. L. Rev. 63, 69-70 (1989). As with any contract,
the signatories can enforce the contract; however, the parties can also decide to
limit which terms can be enforced by governmental versus non-governmental
signatories.
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for the developer to comply with its commitments (i.e., incorporating
a specific date by which a new park would be constructed after the
development of new residential/commercial buildings are
completed). 47 This ensures that a CBA is not an illusory or
aspirational agreement that allows a developer to claim public
support during the approval process without signing on to any firm
obligations. Furthermore, whether benefits are bargained for through
CBAs or developed through incentive programs codified in local law,
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms must still exist once a
development is built to ensure that the local community actually
receives the promised benefits.4 8
IV. LEGAL ISSUES

Perhaps surprisingly, there is a dearth of law on the legality of
CBAs. The fact that there is little litigation on CBAs suggests that
CBAs are supported by communities and are having a positive effect
in resolving conflicts between developers and community groups.
In the absence of statutes or regulations specifically authorizing
CBAs and with the lack of case law, the question will arise as to
whether a particular CBA is lawful. Essentially, the questions are:
(1) is it permissible for developers to bargain for discretionary
approvals or relief from local land use laws?; And (2) is it
permissible for local governments to demand concessions from
developers that are not set forth in local law? The doctrines
discussed below might help in answering these questions:
A. Development Agreements

Some have analogized CBAs to development agreements, and
contend that CBAs can be entered into by municipalities only in
those states that also allow development agreements. 49 However,
development agreements address a slightly different concern than
CBAs. Development agreements involve bargaining for amenities
from a developer, but the quidpro quo from the local government is a
commitment to freeze the zoning requirements applicable to the

47. See Gross, supra note 2, at 70; See generally Williams, supra note 44.
48. See Gross, supra note 2, at 69.
49. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 1, at 115.
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project for a set period of time.50 Therefore, development agreements
essentially bind future legislatures to a project. CBAs do not force a
government to approve a project, and certainly do not purport to bind
future legislatures, so there should not be a presumption that because
development agreements are prohibited by state law, CBAs should be
as well.
B. Incentive Zoning

Based on the legislative and judicial approval of incentive zoning,
there is a strong argument that bargaining for development is not per
se against public policy.
New York State law authorizes local governments to establish
systems to grant relief from density, area, height, open space, use or
other zoning requirements for developers who opt to provide specific
amenities such as open space, day care, low income housing, or cash
in lieu of such amenities.5 1 Like CBAs, incentive zoning allows
developers to fund amenities that might be too costly for
municipalities to provide, and allows municipalities to opt for denser
development that provides property tax benefits.
Special incentive districts have been upheld by the New York State
Court of Appeals. For example, in Asian Americans for Equality v.

Koch, the Court of Appeals upheld the Special Manhattan Bridge
District, which granted a bonus of additional square footage in
exchange for community facilities, low income housing, or
rehabilitation of existing housing. 52 In this case, the court also
rejected challenges alleging violations of the equal protection clause,
exclusionary zoning, and piecemeal zoning.5 3
Nevertheless, courts have identified some limits to incentive
zoning. For example, in MunicipalArt Society of New York v. City of

New York, a court invalidated a $57 million unrestricted payment not targeted to any specific amenity - to be an impermissible
component of a bonus zoning arrangement for the New York

50. See City of W. Hollywood v. Beverly Towers, Inc., 805 P.2d 329, 334 n.6,
335 (Cal. 1991).
51. See N.Y. Town Law § 261-b (McKinney 2004); see also N.Y. Village Law
§ 7-703 (McKinney 1996); N.Y. General City Law § 81-d (McKinney 2003).
52. 527 N.E.2d 265, 268, 373 (N.Y. 1988).
53. Id. at 266, 268-69, 271-72.
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Coliseum site.54 The $35 to $40 million in subway improvements for
the Columbus Circle station, however, were not found to be
problematic.
One could argue that any zoning relief that is not specifically
authorized by a formal system established pursuant to the
authorization in statutes such as Town Law section 261-b, and
instead bargained for on a case-by-case basis, should be suspect.
Nevertheless, in DePaolo v. Town of Ithaca, the Appellate Division,
Third Department, approved a bargain that was not authorized by a
generally applicable system of incentives - a grant by Cornell
University to the Town of Ithaca of a 99-year license to use property
adjacent to Cayuga Lake as a public park, conditioned upon the
amendment of the local zoning ordinance to accommodate a new
lake-source cooling system for the university. 56 It should
nevertheless be noted that if a local government were to require such
access, the demand would be subject to substantive due process
constitutional limits requiring nexus and proportionality between an
exaction and the projected impacts of a development.5 7
C. ConditionalZoning And ContractZoning
There are several well-established land use doctrines that deal with
concerns about individual property owners seeking to opt out of
generally applicable zoning districts.
Two of those that are
potentially analogous to some of the concerns raised in connection
with CBAs are contract zoning and conditional zoning.
Because CBAs involve contracts and zoning, "contract zoning"
may appear to be a doctrine that should be applicable. However, in
most cases, it is not. Contract zoning is prohibited." It occurs when a
municipality promises in advance to grant zoning relief in exchange
for a benefit. 59 However, unless there is a contract purporting to bind
a local legislature in advance to vote in a specific way, there is no

54. 137 Misc.2d 832, 833 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987).
55. Id. at 832.
56. 258 A.D.2d 68, 70-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
57. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374-75 (1994); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 826, 827, 836-37 (1987).
58. See Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683 (N.Y. 1960); See also
Collard v. Inc. Village of Flower Hill,, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821 (N.Y. 1981).
59. See Collard,421 N.E.2d at 821.
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contract zoning.60 A CBA typically involves a developer promising
to do certain things if and when certain approvals are granted, but the
local government remains free to grant or deny such permits or
approvals based on its findings under local laws and regulations. The
court in DePaolo, described above, dismissed a challenge to the deal
on contract zoning grounds for precisely this reason - the Town of
Ithaca was not bound by any contract to vote to grant a rezoning.6 1
"Conditional zoning" also might also seem to be a doctrine that
could be analogized to CBAs, because CBAs involve conditions on
development. Conditional zoning occurs when a zoning decision is
conditioned on the execution of a private agreement restricting the
use of the rezoned parcel, and it is permissible if the conditions relate
to the property at issue and are reasonable. 62 For example, conditions
must apply only to the property being rezoned, and not the owner
personally. 63 However, this is probably not a doctrine that will be
helpful to a CBA opponent. First, the New York State Court of
Appeals has held that when the property owner has accepted the
conditions, no one else has standing to contest them.64 In addition, the
remedy is often striking the conditions from the permit or variance,
and not invalidation of the zoning decision, which is hardly the result
that a challenger to a project would want. 65
V. CONCLUSION
CBAs have become increasingly widespread over the past decade.
Ethical and policy issues and practical concerns such as the need for
broad community participation, effective negotiation, binding
commitments, and enforcement are raised over and over again in
various contexts. CBAs have not been the subject of much litigation,
and therefore it can be argued that they serve to reduce conflict.
However, the lack of litigation also means that despite increasing use,
60. See id. at 821-22.
61. See De Paolo, 258 A.D.2d at 71.
62. See Church, 168 N.E.2d at 681, 683; Collard, 421 N.E.2d at 821.
63. St. Onge v. Donovan, 522 N.E.2d 1019, 1020, 1023 (1988).
64. See Church, 168 N.E.2d at 681, 683; see also East End Prop. Co. #'1, LLC
v. Town Bd. of Brookhaven, No. 2007-05041, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9034,
at *1-3 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 25, 2008) (finding that local residences did not have
standing to challenge CBA among the Town of Brookhaven, Caithness and Long
Island Power Authority).
65. See St. Onge, 533 N.E.2d at 1024-25.
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CBAs probably will continue to have an uncertain legal status,
particularly where CBAs are forced on developers to address
measures that are unrelated to environmental or land use mitigation.

